happens to be amorphous since such weapons span a huge spectrum. Dual-use issues is another complexity which is also associated with the lack of a clear definition if WMDs. To demonstrate the complexity, the speaker referred to the uses of white phosphorous which was used by Israel in Gaza and by US forces in Falluja; Today, white phosphorous is also used as a smoke weapon to mark a target; white phosphorous and other items needs to be incorporated into the CWC. Each of the legal instruments created to deal with various categories of WMDs addresses only small aspects of the entire system, making the WMD approach a fragmented one. The speaker concluded that while there is a need to separate the three categories of WMDs, we must still maintain close coordination of the three categories for progress to take place.
Ali Karami, associate professor at Baqiyatallah University of Medical Sciences in Tehran. The dual uses of biological agents makes it very difficult to detect, even qualified inspectors finds it almost impossible to confirm the existence of biological weapons due to their dual civil/military uses and also due to the very secretive arrangements. Anthrax is a good example, the anthrax vaccine can be quickly converted to anthrax which makes it difficult to prove intentions. Although much attention is given to nuclear weapons, the speaker affirmed that biological weapons represent a greater risk. The speaker referred to few cases within the Iranian context including a "suspicious outbreak" in Iran in 2006 in which a "few people" died and believes that was most likely a case of bioterrorism. He also stated that in the early 2000s during the US anthrax outbreak, Iran has received 2 envelopes with anthrax inside. Dr Karami touched upon Iran's nuclear program which is dedicated for peaceful purposes, he referred to the "fatwa", the religious ruling prohibiting the development or possession of nuclear weapons as proof that Iran would not engage in nuclear proliferation and that no evidence exists that Iran is moving towards proliferation.
Dina Esfandiary, research analyst at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (UK).
Suggested that Syria has the largest chemical weapons arsenal in the Middle East, which was created as a balance against Israel's nuclear weapons. Syria's program began in the 1970s and received assistance from North Korea and Iran as recently confirmed by Wikileaks. Despite the lack of information, intelligence, and resources relating to chemical weapons in Syria, it is feared that Syria will lose control of its stockpiles, allowing for the spread of weapons to the rebels or to non-state actors like Hezbollah. With porous borders, weapons could escape the country posing the question of how such an arsenal might be secured. The speaker then highlighted a number of theoretical options that have been proposed including a possible Israeli air strike. This is extremely unsafe, as it will lead to fallout, looting (and/or) weapons getting into the wrong hands. The Middle East has a proven history of using chemical weapons including an alleged Egyptian use of chemical weapons in Yemen's civil war and the existence of an Egyptian chemical weapons program in the 1960s. As for Iran, the speaker suggests that Iran has a chemical program, adding that Iran has declared its facilities after joining the CWC, but not declaring its weapons. Dina agrees that various WMD categories should be separated, stating that the focus should be on chemical weapons first. 
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Lukasz Kulesa, head of the non-proliferation and arms control project at the Polish Institute of International Affairs. Addressing a Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone could be referred to as "mission impossible", particularly when including delivery systems to the scope of the zone. The task is unique, both in scope and difficulty, if for no other reason, because not all states involved recognize each other. A number of political impediments including regional political transformation, the Syrian conflict, the Iranian "crisis" and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are factors which make it difficult to focus on WMD non-proliferation. Following a discussion on strategic impediments facing the Helsinki Process, Mr. Kulesa concluded that the Obama administration is unlikely to use its limited political capital to leverage Israel to act upon anything but the peace process.
Istvan Balogh, junior research fellow at the Hungarian Institute of International Affairs. Analyzing trends affecting foreign policy of key regional power brokers explains how their regional position and interests may either promote or hinder the accomplishment of the Helsinki conference goals. Iran has clearly benefited from the regional strategic trends of the past decade. Israel's absence is closely connected to its military capabilities as well as the Arab-Israel conflict. The Arab Spring destabilized Israel's strategic environment and for now it is not likely to engage in realizing any "grand design" for the region, thus, it is more likely to standby and wait for events to span out. The position regarding the prospect of a WMDFZ of other regional power brokers is likely to depend on the stances of the two previous players, namely Israel and Iran. Mr Balog concludes that Turkey is significant element when it comes to the zone issue due to the presence of US tactical weapons and NATO interceptors, expressing that he was not enthusiastic for the creation of a MEWMDFZ.
Erzsébet Rozsa, executive director and senior research fellow at the Hungarian Institute of International Affairs. The Middle East is generally considered as one of the most conflict-prone regions of the world. In spite of the fact that all categories of WMDs can be found here, the region has no security architecture or common security culture. While the proposed Helsinki Conference on the Middle East would be a step forward, the political and social trends and "facts on the ground" may prove to be unsurpassable obstacles along the way. While -as historical evidence shows -a NWFZ can be started with only a number of regional states upon the expectation of a snowball effect. In the Middle East there is one country (Israel) generally accepted as having nuclear weapons, and another (Iran) which is considered by many a threat due to its nuclear program, the participation of both is vital, even if the MEC is understood as not just one conference, but rather as the beginning of a long process. The complexity of this undertaking, i.e. balancing and counter-balancing different capabilities, security concerns, the necessity of operating bilateral and multilateral tracks etc, may prove an insurmountable obstacle Ironically, the weakness of HCoC could be attractive for the missile-relevant Middle Eastern/Gulf countries, none of which is a member. To join the HCoC could show that regional cooperation is possible in the security sector.
7 entail greater security.
Christian Weidlich, graduate research assistant at the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF). Aside from PRIF efforts to contribute to the creation of a Missile Free Zone in the Middle East, the institute provides ideas, concepts, and background information on the planned Middle East Conference on the establishment of a WMD and Delivery Vehicles Free Zone. Bearing in mind that the Middle East conference is badly needed to foster communication among countries of the region, participating states will engage in a constructive manner and agree on follow-on steps only if they expect the Conference to bolster their security. The speaker was of the opinion that holding the Conference with an inclusive participation could already contribute to reducing tensions in the region, adding that less weapons can Sven-Eric Fikenscher, research assistant at the Academic Peace Orchestra (Frankfurt). A promising starting point for the control and eventual elimination of delivery vehicles such as missiles and aircraft is the establishment of a certain degree of military transparency. In this regard, the United Nations Register for Conventional Arms (UNROCA) is a fruitful point of reference since it covers both categories: missiles and aircraft. However, the UNROCA only lists imported items and therefore needs to be revised and expanded. The revised UNROCA can create the political will needed to embark on the gradual reduction path towards a Missile Free Zone. In conclusion, the speaker stated that unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) need to be included within the scope of delivery vehicles.
Panel VI: Regional Experiences and International Perspectives
Chair and moderator: Deobrah Rosenblum, executive vice-president of NTI Ronald Sturm, head of unit/executive secretariat for Nuclear disarmament at the Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs (Austria). Austria is member of the Human Security Network that takes a «humankind first» approach to security. Nuclear disarmament is a special responsibility of the nuclear weapon and nuclear armed states, but it also concerns all states. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is the cornerstone of the (current) nuclear disarmament and nuclear nonproliferation regime. Its implementation is crucial to provide the confidence needed for nuclear disarmament and also for enjoying the benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty provides the verification regime to ensure that no nuclear test explosion remains undetected. The Conference on Disarmament -the negotiating forum for disarmament -has been blocked for too long. Legal instruments alone do not suffice to ensure the complete elimination of nuclear weapons swiftly and effectively, further elements for a comprehensive legal nuclear disarmament framework need to be agreed upon. Civil Society is becoming more vocal in demanding nuclear disarmament. Individual states, groups of states, international organisations and civil society movements can fruitfully work together or support each other in creating and improving the conditions needed for the swift and effective elimination of nuclear weapons by the nuclear possessor states. ones in ifferent parts of the world can not be extrapolated to the Middle East, as the circumstances and the milieu er highlighted important impediments against the creation of the zone cluding the lack of trust, ongoing transitions, unstable governments as well as non-existing regional bodies apable of verifying and monitoring.
Katsuhisa
Panel VII: Arab Spring and Regional Turmoil -Impact on WMDFZ Issues K Vijay Oberoi, member of the United Service Institute (India). The Middle East, as a Weapons of Mass Destruction-Free Zone (WMD-FZ) has been discussed for decades, but progress has been limited. The appointment of a Facilitator is a welcomed development, but a realistic approach is needed to move forward. Everyone is agreed that a WMDFZ in the Middle East is not just desirable but essential; yet the task is difficult, as the region has a history of various types of conflicts. In such a situation, an incremental approach will pay dividends. The first task would be the building of a consensus between states. This would make the task of the Facilitator simpler. Lack of meaningful progress will adversely affect the current impetus to strengthen the nuclear nonproliferation regime. The speaker concluded by stating that the past success achieved in declaring other Nuclear Weapons Free Z d are different.
Anna Peczeli, affiliated to the Corvinus University of Budapest. The five NWFZs that are currently in place spans most of the southern hemisphere area, the presence of a NWFZ not only prevent the possession on nuclear weapons but further discuss non-stationing, non-use and in some occasions non-testing. Establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZ) has always been considered as a regional approach to strengthen the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. Anton V. Khlopkov, director of the Center for Energy and Security Studies (Russia). Committed to developing nuclear power for the best interests of the state, Iran's goals have remained essentially the same since the 1970s when they were first formulated by the Shah's regime. Together with diversifying electric power resource for the country, the development of nuclear technology was also utilized to providin keys rule pplies here). Double elections (in the United States and Iran) could create new opportunities to accelerate a y n they do not co-exist easily and in some cases may be irectly contradictory. The choices it makes will have a decisive impact on the prospects for establishing a speaker was of the opinion that Iran will witness an economic deterioration due to sanctions, this would demonstrate to th efforts, the new government, strengthened by new domestic legitimacy, could be able to strike new paths and end e stalemate surrounding arms control negotiations on a future MEWMDFZ.
Iran with the scientific, technological and material resources that could be used for military purposes if there are strong incentives and based on the security concerns. Yet, there is no reliable information suggesting that the leadership in Iran has made the political decision to create nuclear weapons, either during the Shah time or recently. Due to many reasons, there is no military solution to the Iranian nuclear crisis. This means that a resolution has to be sought in the political and diplomatic sphere. Iranian security concerns should be addressed. However, Iranian nuclear program is not the core of the problem, but rather a consequence of a very deep crisis in Iran-US relations. The keys for the solution are in Washington and Tehran (two a dialogue for finding a wa out of the crisis.
Martin B. Malin, executive director of the Project on Managing the Atom at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government. Israel›s strategic environment is undergoing rapid change. The increasing political participation of Arab publics will likely mean increased regional isolation for Israel and pressure on the nuclear issue. US-Israeli interests, while still closely aligned, have shown signs of divergence over Israel's preferred course of action toward Iran and toward the Palestinians. Continuing interest in nuclear energy across the region will mean a continuing diffusion of nuclear knowledge. To confront these changes, Israel can attempt to extend its nuclear monopoly by preventing the emergence of nuclear capability in neighboring states through a combination of diplomatic effort, sabotage, and the use of military force; it can prepare to enter into and manage an active nuclear deterrent relationship with Iran and, eventually, perhaps other states in the region; it can seek formal security assurances from the United States; or, it can enter into negotiations with its neighbors to establish a regime that will regulate security relationships in the region, eventually putting its own capabilities on the negotiating table. Although these options are not mutually exclusive, in combinatio d cooperative regional security structure and WMD-free zone in the Middle East.
ofessor in International Politics at the Universiteit Antwerpen (Belgium).
Iran is building up its nuclear program and economic sanctions will take time. Oil embargo is not universal and the Arab spring may lead to more instability in the region. Within the public conception, there is some uncertainty about a possible nuclear weapons program in Iran, the reason for this is what we have witnessed of false allegations in the case of Iraq. How likely is an Israeli attack, the speaker believes that Iran's nuclear facilities are mostly underground and Israel doesn't have the capabilities to attack heavily fortified facilities. When it comes to options of preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, the Tom Sauer, associate pr e leaders in Iran the grave costs of a nuclear weapon program Daniel Müller, research associate at PRIF. Initiatives calling for the establishment of weapons of mass destruction-free zone in the Middle East have so far failed to achieve concrete results. The recent dramatic political shifts in the aftermath of the Arab uprising hold the potential of aggravating distrust. Observers fear that the newly emerging governments might adopt confrontational policies in regional issues. Egypt, one of the most influential states in the region and the strongest promoter of the zone is undergoing a substantial political transition. The introduction of a set of reciprocal confidence building measures between Egypt and Israel is greatly needed. The speaker highlighted the chances which the current transition phase might entail for Egypt's arms control Jean-Loup Samaan, researcher and lecturer in NATO Defense College's. While media and experts focus their attention on the question of "when" or "if " Iran is going to cross the nuclear threshold, a new scenario is quietly looming: the scenario of nuclear opacity in the Middle East. In other words, there is increasingly a serious likelihood that in the coming five to ten years the Middle East could be the scene of power play between countries holding undeclared nuclear arsenals, namely Israel and Iran. This regional nuclear opacity could prove to be a major driver of instability in terms of conflict prevention and non-proliferation efforts. If we look at the history of the Iranian nuclear crisis, nothing has been more complicated and vexing for the analysts than to identify what precisely is the nuclear threshold, what are Iran's intentions and, finally, if at all Iran would cross this rmation on security perceptions, doctrines, capabilities, or targeting policies.
Tom Coppen, researcher at the Center for Conflict and Security Law -Utrecht University. The NPT provides a global platform for negotiations on nuclear disarmament. NPT Review Conferences have both an important political and legal function, they are the NPT's mechanism for review, implementation and supervision. In legal terms, they NPT Revcons's enable the evolution of the NPT based on subsequent agreement. Much has been written about the perceived weaknesses of the NPT and challenges it has been facing over the last decades. Despite these perceptions, the NPT managed to maintain its It entails no inf and its managerial approach to keep this position for the decades to come.
Alexander Kolbin, Program Coordinator at PIR Center (Russia).
Within existing models of establishing a multilateral arms control and non-proliferation regimes, a number of initial steps could be taken by states of the region to overcome the current impasse and start a real movement towards the establishment of a WMD-free zone in the Middle East. Obviously, the region suffers from an acute mistrust created by historical, political, economic and social challenges which lead into a sensitive behavior. When it comes to establishing a permanent regional confidence building mechanism in the nuclear sphere, as well as chemical and biological weapons, its only natural to have parties refraining from the threat of using force. Although the creation of the zone would not resolve issues like Hezbollah, or standing issues between Iran and Gulf countries, the s a establishing a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction. eting. The advancement of non-proliferation fforts and the establishment of a NWFZ requires not only government cooperation, but also the ort to chieve consensus. Such task force could be utilized by the facilitator, it would also provide an appropriate ctice a vibrant and effective role when it comes to establishing the zone. hese instruments were specifically named within the context of the 2010 NPT Revcon final document to he Amman meeting witnessed the launch of a specialized study prepared by ACSIS in cooperation with
The organizers concluded by stressing on the importance on maintaining dialogue and called for a civil society review conference to be held in Amman during 2013.
(WMD) in general and war do not solve any confrontation and that it is imperative to establish nuclear weapons free zones (NWFZ). World without nuclear weapons and even a ntries similar to EU.
Benjamin Hautecouverture, Research fellow at the CESIM and FRS. Mr. Hautecouverture highlighted the conclusions of the 2012 Brussels session of the EU Consortium. The July 2010 decision by the Council of the European Union created a network bringing together foreign policy institutions and research centres from across the EU to encourage political and security-related dialogue. The Brussels meeting was a good opportunity to engage think tanks, civil society, experts, researchers and academics in discussing measures to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their association of co weapons. The outcome of discussions are submitted to the responsible officials within the European Union
Ayman Khalil, director of the Arab Institute fir Security Studies. Presented the conclusions of the Amman meeting and officially announced the launch of the Arab Consortium on Security and Disarmament which was sponsored and hosted by the Arab Institute for Security Studies. The Arab consortium held its inauguration meeting within the framework of the Amman me e involvement of institutions, NGOs, and the global population.
As the number of initiatives are increasing, its vital to coordinate in order not to replicate and in order to magnify the output of these initiatives. Today, there exist a number of initiatives dedicated to promote the establishment of a WMDFZ-ME. Since these initiatives are dedicated to achieve the same objective, its only natural to harmonize such efforts and coordinate their activities. The Amman meeting called for establishing a Middle East Task Group that would act as an umbrella to bring together sporadic efforts in an eff a mechanism to involve civil society involvement in the Helsinki conference or any other discussions.
The Amman meeting strongly calls for an effective involvement by international instruments, namely IAEA, OPCW, CTBTO .. etc and to pra T provide support to the facilitator.
T GCSP analyzing the role of civil society organizations as well as international instruments.
Workshop on Building International Confidence and Responsibility in Nuclear Security
November 14, 2012
Summary Report roject of the Asan Institute for Policy Studies, Partnership for Global ecurity, and the Stanley Foundation.
The c tracks:
• Messaging on and educating about the importance of nuclear security lders to help create a more bust, flexible, and comprehensive global nuclear security governance system. clear security was one option onsidered for strengthening and streamlining the current patchwork system. icipation f Ambassador Piet de Klerk, Ambassador of the Netherlands in Amman and sherpa of NSS 2014.
Nuclear Security Governance Experts Group
Amman, Jordan
Stemming from the belief that progress on the nuclear security track will positively impact non-proliferation efforts, the Arab Institute for Security Studies (ACSIS) in cooperation with the Nuclear Security Governance Experts Group (NSGEG) convened the nuclear security workshop in Amman, Jordan on November 14, 2012. The NSGEG is a globally diverse group with broad nuclear sector experience assessing the current state of nuclear security governance and developing a realistic and comprehensive set of policy recommendations intended to facilitate improvement in the nuclear security regime and the continued peaceful use of nuclear power. It is a p S dis ussions included four substantive discussion • Defining an end state for nuclear security • Balancing sovereignty with global responsibility • Nuclear security structures beyond the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit (NSS)
The objective of the workshop was to generate policy recommendations on how to increase international confidence and responsibility in nuclear security. The discussions greatly benefited from the insights of regional experts recommended by ACSIS, including from Algeria, Egypt, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia. Initial recommendations from this event will be published as part of a full conference report and posted on the NSGEG website. They will then be integrated with related policy recommendations derived from prior NSGEG workshops in London and Seoul and promoted to nuclear stakeho ro Participants envisioned necessary measures to eliminate weak links from the international nuclear security regime. They examined the roles of national systems, international instruments, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and other multilateral initiatives, such as the NSS process, in achieving this ambitious goal. Participants considered objectives for the 2014 NSS and follow-on structures and initiatives that could outlive the summit process. An international framework agreement for nu c Participants discussed the benefits of an expanded definition of nuclear security that includes fissile materials, radiological sources, and nuclear facilities, and the relevance of the issue to all states. They explored regional approaches to advancing global nuclear security, including how the network of centers of excellence established as part of the NSS process and sponsored by the IAEA and European Union could help foster cooperation and build local capacities. Radiological security was identified as one important area that is wellsuited for regional collaboration. Discussions were especially important due to the presence and part o "Arab Consortium o Non-Proliferation" Inauguration Statement November 12, 2012 n Security and Nuclear
Amman, Jordan
The Amman meeting facilitated and sponsored the first coordination meeting of Arab research centers and think tanks involved in nuclear non-proliferation and the establishment of a Middle East zone free from nuclear weapons as well as all forms of weapons of mass destruction was convened in Amman on November hing a zone free from nuclear weapons and all forms of he consortium reac an na on me ded: ) As a result of the Amman deliberations hosted by the Arab Institute for Security Studies on November 12 th , 2, t e following was agreed upon:
• hat relates regional security issues that are of interest to the region and to s • portant developments in the field of non-proliferation and e Consortium member, period
• ecurity and
• stress on the importance of its engagement in the Helsinki meeting and the overall representation of civil society sector.
• The Arab Consortium affirms the importance of coordinating and cooperating with international research centers and civil society organizations of similar interests.
Drafted in Amman (Jordan) November 12 th , 2012
• Declare the creation of the Arab Consortium on Security and Nuclear Non-Proliferation with the purpose of establishing a zone free from nuclear weapons as well as all forms of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East (WMDFZME). The Consortium seeks to support Arab effort on the international scene not only in the filed of nonproliferation but also it w the globe. The consortium will provide decision makers in Arab countries with studies, proposal as well as suggesting feasible options to assist decisions and plan policies with a view of achieving common Arab interest • The Consortium welcomes joint cooperation with the League of Arab States in its efforts aiming to create a WMDFZME. To achieve this objective, the Consortium will provide any required studies, analyses and support.
• Establish a quad-lateral committee to coordinate, to follow-up and to plan Consortium activities and programs. The committee will meet on a rotational basis, its membership is renewed on a biannual basis; quad-lateral committee currently consist of ECFA, ACSIS, INEGMA and ATF.
Hold an annual meeting (or semi-annual meetings whenever needed) for consortium members to discuss emerging issues and im establishing a WMDFZME. The annual meeting will be hosted by one of th the host institute will be responsible for logistical arrangements and becomes a chairman of the Consortium for a one year • The Arab Institute for Security Studies will chair the coordination committee
The Consortium welcomes the membership of any Arab research institutes interested in s non-proliferation issues The Arab Consortium on Security and Nuclear Non-Proliferation
